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TWENTY-EIGHT YEARS LATER: DELANEY V. MCCOY
AND SUPPLEMENTAL PARTITIONS OF COMMUNITY
PROPERTY IN LOUISIANA
Claire Murray *
Twenty-eight years after Mack McCoy’s divorce, his ex-wife,
Claudine McCoy Delaney, filed a supplemental petition for
partition of community property. 1 Ms. Delaney sought a pro rata
share of Mr. McCoy’s retirement benefits. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeal held that Ms. Delaney’s supplemental partition
was not barred by res judicata because when an asset is omitted
from a community property settlement by mutual oversight, the
matter has not yet been adjudicated and is properly subject to
modification.
I. BACKGROUND
Mack Allen McCoy and Claudine Mason McCoy Delaney
married on November 16, 1973. On June 27, 1979, Mr. McCoy
filed a petition for separation. After termination of the community
property regime, Ms. Delaney filed a petition for settlement of the
parties’ community property. Ms. Delaney propounded
interrogatories to Mr. McCoy regarding the existence of a
retirement plan related to his employment at the Shreveport Fire
Department. He answered, “The parties have no vested interest in
any retirement plan.” 2
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1. Delaney v. McCoy, 47,240 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/20/12), 93 So. 3d 845.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeal heard this dispute twice. The 2012 opinion,
Delaney v. McCoy, 93 So. 3d 845, is the subject of this case note.
2. Delaney, 93 So. 3d at 847.
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Following a trial, the court entered a judgment partitioning the
community property. The judgment set forth which items of the
former community were to be partitioned in kind and which were
to be partitioned by licitation, yet the judgment made no mention
of retirement benefits.
Twenty-seven years later, Mr. McCoy retired from the fire
department. The following year, Ms. Delaney filed a supplemental
petition for partition of community property, alleging that the
retirement benefits that had accrued during the marriage had been
omitted from the prior community property partition. Mr. McCoy
filed exceptions of res judicata and no right and no cause of action.
The trial court denied the exceptions. Mr. McCoy then filed a
petition for rehearing. Upon rehearing, the court granted Mr.
McCoy’s exception of res judicata, reasoning that the existence of
a settlement agreement itself indicated intent to settle all claims
that either party had or may have against the former community of
acquets and gains. 3
Ms. Delaney appealed the trial court decision granting Mr.
McCoy’s exception of res judicata. Because Mr. McCoy failed to
introduce critical documents into evidence, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeal found he had not met his burden of proof. The
court remanded for further proceedings.
On remand, the trial court held a hearing in June 2011. With all
the required documentation admitted into evidence, the trial court
again granted Mr. McCoy’s exception of res judicata. Ms. Delaney
again appealed.
II. DECISION OF THE COURT
The Second Circuit Court of Appeal held that Ms. Delaney’s
action was not barred by res judicata. Because the retirement
benefits were never specifically mentioned in the community
3. See Delaney v. McCoy, 63 So. 3d 327 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2011) (the
Second Circuit Court of Appeal’s first opinion in this matter).
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property settlement, the partitioning of the asset had not been
formerly adjudicated. Accordingly, the issue was not barred by res
judicata. Ms. Delaney was entitled to file a supplementary petition
for partition of community property.
III. COMMENTARY
Under Louisiana’s community property regime, each spouse
owns a present, undivided one-half interest in the community
during its existence. 4 If a property right results from a spouse’s
employment during the existence of the community, then it is a
community asset and is subject to division upon dissolution of the
marriage. 5 When the community terminates, the employee’s
spouse is the owner of one-half of the amount attributable to the
pension or retirement benefit earned during the existence of the
community. 6
Upon termination of the community property regime, the
spouses, as co-owners, may extra-judicially partition the
community property, 7 or may seek judicial partition under the
aggregate theory. 8 Under this theory, the court allocates the
community assets and liabilities so that each spouse receives
property of equal net value. 9 If the allocation results in an unequal
net distribution, the court will order payment of an equalizing sum
of money. 10 The Delaney parties partitioned their community
property voluntarily.
The question presented in Delaney concerns how to
appropriately treat a community property settlement agreement
that fails to mention retirement benefits correspondent to a portion
of time during the existence of the community property regime.
4. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2336 (2012).
5. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2338 (2012).
6. Day v. Day, 858 So. 2d 483, 491 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2003).
7. 16 KATHERINE S. SPAHT & RICHARD D. MORENO, LOUISIANA CIVIL
LAW TREATISE: MATRIMONIAL REGIMES 661 (3d ed., West 2007).
8. Id. at 688.
9. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:2801(A)(4)(b) (2012).
10. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:2801(A)(4)(d) (2012).
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Louisiana jurisprudence provides that, when an agreement does not
expressly address the employee spouse’s pension, the issue of
whether the agreement divests the other spouse of any community
property right to the pension depends on the intent of the parties.11
In order to determine the intent of the parties, the court will
examine the agreement and other evidence to see whether the nonemployee spouse appears to have intended to abandon any future
claims to the former community property. 12 The resolution of the
intent question determines the applicability of res judicata; if a
non-employee spouse did not intend to divest him or herself of a
right to the benefit, then the matter has not yet been adjudicated
and res judicata does not apply.
To ascertain the intent of the parties, the court will look for an
indication that the parties discussed the asset during the events
leading up to the drafting of the agreement. A lack of discussion
regarding the asset tends to indicate that the non-employee spouse
did not waive his or her right in the asset. In Robinson v. Robinson,
the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized that supplementary
partitions like Ms. Delaney’s have been allowed where the spouses
had not discussed the pension or retirement benefits before
confecting their community property settlements. 13 In Robinson,
the parties’ partition settlement did not address the division of the
former husband’s pension plan. Moreover, both parties testified
that they did not discuss the benefits in the context of their
settlement. 14 The court found that, since the benefits were never
discussed, the former wife could not have intended to transfer her
right in the pension plan. 15
In Adams v. Adams, the Second Circuit Court of Appeal held
that a community property settlement could not be declared null
11. Jennings v. Turner, 803 So. 2d 963, 965 (La. 2001); see LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 2045 (2012).
12. See Robinson v. Robinson, 778 So. 2d 1105, 1120 (La. 2001).
13. Id. at 1119-21.
14. Id. at 1120.
15. Id.
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based on the erroneous omission of an asset neither party knew
they owned. 16 In that case, the parties were unaware that a parcel
of land was part of their community property. Accordingly, the
parties made no mention of the parcel in their community property
settlement. When the former wife tried to nullify the agreement on
the basis of error, the court found that the agreement reflected only
an intent to change their ownership interests as to the assets
listed. 17
The original trial court in Delaney found that the settlement
indicated an intent of the parties to settle all claims the parties may
have had or will have in the future relating to the former
community of acquets and gains. 18 The Second Circuit, in its
second Delaney opinion, adhered more strictly to the
jurisprudential rule: even when an original partition expressly
purports to be a full and final property settlement between the
spouses, courts have allowed supplemental partitions of omitted
assets when the facts and the intent of the parties warrant it. 19 The
court examined the record and found no evidence of a discussion
beyond Mr. McCoy’s answer that there was no “vested interest” in
retirement benefits. 20 The court explained that, when neither party
mentions retirement pay during negotiations and settlement, the
failure to include the retirement pay in the settlement is a “mere
omission” which can be amended by supplemental petition. 21
The law of res judicata has changed since the Delaney parties
entered into their settlement. The changes were substantive and the
court was required to apply the previous law. Under former
Louisiana Civil Code article 2286:
The authority of the thing adjudged takes place only with
respect to what was the object of the judgment. The thing
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Adams v. Adams, 503 So. 2d 1052, 1056 (La. Ct. App.. 1987).
Adams, 503 So. 2d at 1056.
Delaney, 93 So. 3d at 848.
Id. at 850.
Id.
Id.
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demanded must be the same; the demand must be founded
on the same cause of action; the demand must be between
the same parties, and formed by them against each other in
the same quality. 22
Because Mr. McCoy was the party urging the exception, he had
the burden of proving each essential element by a preponderance
of the evidence. The Second Circuit held that the “thing
demanded” was not the same. 23 Because the parties did not discuss
the benefits and Ms. Delaney did not expressly waive her right to
them, the court found there was no adjudication of the particular
asset at all. If any retirement benefits accrued during the marriage
of the parties, Ms. Delaney has remained a co-owner and is entitled
to a partition of the property.
Though Ms. Delaney did not move to supplement the
agreement until twenty-eight years after settlement, her right has
not prescribed. Under Louisiana law, items omitted from judicial
and extra-judicial partitions are always subject to supplementary
partition; the right never prescribes. 24 Under the successions
section of the Civil Code, the mere omission of a thing belonging
to the succession is not ground for rescission, but only for
supplementary partition. 25 By analogy, Louisiana courts have
incorporated the successions rule into the matrimonial regimes
context; when a plaintiff moves to file a supplementary petition of
a community asset omitted from the original community property
settlement through “mutual oversight,” 26 he or she is entitled to do
so and the right does not prescribe.
Though the Second Circuit’s decision is legally sound, whether
the decision is the right one is a more difficult determination.
Delaney illustrates a clash between two important societal

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 849 (emphasis added).
Delaney, 93 So. 3d at 851.
Succession of Tucker, 445 So. 2d 510 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1401 (2012).
Succession of Tucker, 445 So. 2d at 513.
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interests: the doctrine of res judicata and Louisiana’s commitment
to the community property regime.
The doctrine of res judicata prohibits the re-litigation of claims
that have been processed to final judgment in an action between
the parties. 27 In part, the doctrine exists to ensure judicial
economy; 28 courts simply do not have the time or resources to hear
cases multiple times. Perhaps more importantly, res judicata
guarantees the finality of judgment. 29 In the Delaney case, it may
seem unfair that Ms. Delaney sought a share of Mr. McCoy’s
retirement benefits twenty-eight years after their separation, as res
judicata is meant to impart a sense of certainty after the resolution
of a legal dispute. But res judicata is not implicated when the
judgment is not indeed final, even when the parties believe it to be.
The facts in Delaney are unusual. Twenty-eight years had
passed before Ms. Delaney brought this action seeking her share of
Mr. McCoy’s retirement benefits. At first blush, the court’s
decision would seem to defy the policy goals underlying res
judicata: neither judicial economy nor fairness to Mr. McCoy
would be served by allowing Ms. Delaney’s action to proceed. But
the law is clear: a community property settlement, from which an
asset was inadvertently omitted, is subject to supplemental
partition at any time. On the facts of Delaney, however, the result
appears to be absurd.
Suppose a couple divorced after thirty years of marriage. Upon
divorce, the couple voluntarily partitioned their community
property. Due to a mutual oversight, the couple neglected to
account for a particular community asset. If one of the former
spouses realized his or her mistake just a year later, few would
argue that the holdings of Delaney and its progeny would produce

27. FRANK L. MARAIST, 1A LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: CIVIL
PROCEDURE – SPECIAL PROCEDURES 52 (West 2005).
28. Id. at n.8.
29. Id.
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an unfair result by allowing the spouse to supplement the
agreement.
Suppose the neglected asset were exceptionally valuable. Even
if the disadvantaged spouse did not realize the error until ten years
later, most would find that fairness would be better served if he or
she were allowed to supplement the agreement.
Consider a couple married for just two years prior to divorce. If
their community property settlement neglected to include an asset
of even nominal value, few would argue that the disadvantaged
spouse should not be able to supplement the agreement.
The facts in Delaney distract from how fair the law actually is.
Mr. McCoy and Ms. Delaney were married for less than six years,
she initiated her action twenty-eight years after they settled their
community property agreement, and the amount in question is
likely minimal. Though the law applied in this case produced an
unusual result, it is not difficult to imagine situations in which the
law would be applied so as to adequately protect Louisiana’s
community property regime.

